INTRODUCTION
It all begins with two teenagers, one seventeen years old and the other eighteen years old, who have been in a relationship for almost a year. Later, their families learn about them. The girl’s family disapproves of their relationship because of the different caste and societal statuses and files a First Information Report (FIR) against the boy under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. Overnight, a consensual relationship turns into a criminal sexual offence. The boy has been arrested, goes to the trial and if convicted, he will face a mandatory minimum sentence. His life, which has barely started, grinds to a halt. Why?
This may sound like a hypothetical story, but it has been a frequent trend observed in Indian courts for many years. One family began using this as a weapon, but on January 9, 2026, the Supreme Court of India finally said it and called for a remedy, the ROMEO-JULIET CLAUSE.
THE POCSO ACT: INTENT AND ARCHITECTURE
The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act was enacted in 2012, marking a significant advancement in Indian child rights legislation. Before POCSO, child sexual abuse was prosecuted unsatisfactorily under a patchwork of IPC provisions, creating a legal vacuum. POCSO established a comprehensive, child-sensitive framework covering sexual harassment, penetrative sexual assault, and child exploitation, applicable to all genders, with special courts for speedy trial.
The Act defines a “child” as any person below the age of eighteen years.[1] POCSO Act follows a strict liability model, meaning any sexual conduct involving a person under eighteen is illegal, regardless of consent, context, or the other party’s age. This design was deliberate, premised on the view that no child can meaningfully consent to sexual activity. Yet it embedded a structural tension that lawmakers either failed to anticipate or chose to ignore by setting an absolute age ceiling of eighteen; they cannot distinguish between two teenagers in a consensual relationship and a predatory adult.
THE ANATOMY OF MISUSE
In the years after POCSO was passed, it developed into a tool of destruction rather than protection. A disturbing trend has been demonstrated by legal studies and in judicial observations: POCSO is frequently used to weaponise the law against adolescent relationships that families disapprove of, rather than to shield children from abuse. Justice Sanjay Karol, writing for the bench in State of Uttar Pradesh v Anurudh & Anr (9 January 2026), observed that “POCSO cases filed at the behest of a girl’s family objecting to romantic involvement with a young boy have become commonplace and consequent thereto these young boys languish in jails.”
The misuse mechanism is well known in India. To keep the case under POCSO’s purview, the age of girls is frequently fabricated, or discrepancies are made in affidavits and school documents.[2] When an FIR is filed under the POCSO Act, the law’s rigorous framework takes over, including arrest, remand and a protracted pre-trial process. During which the accused loses years of education and work due to the trials and jail time.
A “grim societal chasm” was noted by the Supreme Court in its January 2026 ruling: The actual victim for whom the law was intended is still inaccessible to them because of their poverty and the stigma attached to them; at the other end of the people who are equipped with privilege, literacy, and social and monetary capital use the same law “to their advantage.”[3]
THE LANDMARK JUDGMENT: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH V ANURUDH & ANR
In State of Uttar Pradesh v Anurudh & Anr [2026 INSC 47], a bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh addressed the structural failure of POCSO in its handling of adolescent relationships. The case arose from FIR No. 622/2022 registered under IPC section 363, 366 and POCSO section 7 and 8. While upholding bail granted by the Allahabad High Court and setting aside its directions on age determination, Justice Karol used the judgment’s conclusion to publicly call for legislative reform.
To make a specific suggestion to consider “initiation of steps as may be possible to curb this menace, inter alia, the introduction of a Romeo-Juliet clause providing for exemption of genuine juvenile relationships from the grip of this law; enacting a mechanism for prosecution of those persons who, by employing these laws to settle scores,” the Court mandated that “this order be circulated to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India.” This is the most direct and forceful suggestion regarding legislative revision of POCSO’s age parameters to date, and it is coming from the highest court in the land.
A ROMEO – JULIET CLAUSE: WHAT IS IT?
The “Romeo – Juliet clause” is a close-in-age exception to the rules of the age of consent or statutory rape. Instead of reducing the age of consent, such a clause establishes a limited window for voluntary sexual behaviour between people who are both children or near-adults and who are close in age, usually within 2-5 years. The name of this clause is drawn from Shakespeare’s tragedy of young love undone by social forces beyond the lovers’ control.
Such clauses are found across many developed legal systems.[4] Texas exempts cases where the accused is within three years of the complainant’s age. Canada’s Criminal Code contains a comparable close-in-age exemption. The United Kingdom’s Sexual Offences Act 2003, while maintaining a strict consent age of sixteen, incorporates progressive provisions for peer relationships. Germany similarly distinguishes between exploitative adult conduct and consensual peer connections. India, by contrast, operates one of the strictest regimes in the world: an age of consent set at eighteen – among the highest globally – with no provision for contextual exceptions.[5]
CRITICAL ANALYSIS: APPLICABILITY IN INDIA AND RISKS OF MISUSE
The rationale for a Romeo and Juliet clause in India is constitutional in nature. The current framework of POCSO law, which prescribes minimum sentences irrespective of the consensual and peer-based nature of a crime, is vulnerable to violating constitutional articles 14 and 21. Applying the same standards to a seventeen-year-old in a mutually agreed relationship as to a predatory adult goes against the constitutional provision of reasonable classification and life with dignity. The judiciary has itself recognised the fallacy in such a position, stating that POCSO law was never intended to police teenage intimacy.
Nevertheless, it is essential to exercise caution when transporting the Romeo-Juliet clause to the Indian soil. The risk factors, which need to be addressed through legislation, are as follows: Firstly, there is a possibility of an older perpetrator misusing this clause as a defence, even when he continues to exercise coercive influence over his younger victim. Secondly, social realities in India are quite varied, with child marriage, trafficking in the guise of elopement, and FIRs based on honour-related concerns. The “consensual relationship” exception, therefore, can be misused for victimisation, especially against girls from disadvantaged and tribal communities who are already at an access to justice disadvantage in accessing justice. Thirdly, there is an essential question of definition, as what is “genuine” and “voluntary” in an adversarial process can revive victim-blaming inquiry in sexual offence cases, thereby rolling back decades of legislative progress.
The Law Commission itself has chosen the middle course in its recommendations: increased judicial discretion in sentencing for the sixteen to eighteen-year-old age group, rather than making an across-the-board statutory exemption. Any such legislative measure must be coupled with robust checks and balances: definitions of proximity and voluntariness, the exclusion of authority or economic dependency scenarios, and the incorporation of procedural checks to prevent the defence from being abused as a tool for further revictimization.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s January 2026 ruling is not merely a bail order; it is a structural indictment of POCSO’s failure to distinguish protection from punishment. The judiciary has granted bail for years and acquittals as piecemeal remedies. The Court has now signalled that this approach is insufficient – that legislative correction is overdue.
The question of whether to introduce a Romeo–Juliet clause in India is no longer academic. It is a question of constitutional proportionality and social justice. Need for such reform is undeniable; what is essential is that such reform is planned with sufficient care to prevent it from providing avenues for exploitation itself. The question is, what will Parliament’s response or non-response to this situation mean for POCSO, whether it will continue to be an instrument for the protection of children, or turn against them?
Author’s Name: Khushi Patel (Faculty of Law, Law Centre-2, University of Delhi)
References:
[1] Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012, s 2(d).
[2] State of Uttar Pradesh v Anurudh & Anr 2026 INSC 47, [2026] SCC OnLine SC 40, per Karol J.
[3] ibid (Court’s observation on the ‘grim societal chasm’ in POCSO misuse).
[4] Texas Penal Code, s 22.011(e)(1); Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 150.1(2.1); Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK), s 13.
[5] See Ajay Kumar v State (NCT of Delhi) [2022] SCC OnLine Del 3705; Vijayalakshmi v State [2021] SCC OnLine Mad 317.
